


































Faculté des sciences 
économiques et de 
gestion 
Pôle européen de gestion et 
d'économie (PEGE) 
61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 
F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex 
 
Secétariat du BETA 
Christine DEMANGE 
Tél. : (33) 03 90 24 20 69 













« Walsh’s Contract and Transparency about 























Walsh’s Contract and Transparency about Central Bank 
Preferences for Robust Control  
 
 
Meixing DAI   
 Eleftherios SPYROMITROS 






Abstract:  Within a New Keynesian model subject to misspecification, we examine the 
quadratic contracts in a delegation framework where government and private agents are 
uncertain about central bank preferences for model robustness. We show that, in the case of 
complete transparency, the optimal penalty is decreasing in terms of the preference for 
robustness. In effect, a central bank reacts more aggressively to supply shocks when the 
model misspecification grows larger. Furthermore, beginning from the equilibrium of perfect 
transparency and assuming that the average preference for robustness is sufficiently high, the 
central bank has then an incentive to be less transparent in order to reduce the optimal 
penalty. Under similar conditions, we also find that greater opacity will increase inflation and 
output variability.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The New-Keynesian approach to macroeconomic modeling is used extensively by the 
monetary policy literature for almost a decade now. It has produced several important insights 
in the analysis of monetary policy and is now commonly applied to provide policy 
prescriptions (Clarida et al., 1999). Most of the studies focus on specific topics and stay 
unconnected between them. In particular, recent developments on optimal monetary policy in 
forward-looking models have explored separately various notions of transparency and of 
model robustness.  
Several studies use the New-Keynesian models to discuss monetary policy transparency, 
while most of them consider that the central bank knows exactly the model structure of the 
economy. Considering asymmetric losses from output gap, Cukierman (2002) has 
demonstrated that it may be rational for the central bank to de-emphasize a high flexibility 
parameter and asymmetric preferences that might raise inflationary expectations. For Jensen 
(2002), greater transparency about control errors means that policy has a larger impact on 
future expectations and, via this channel, on current equilibrium inflation. This leads the 
central bank to be less aggressive in its policy actions. Walsh (2003) examines accountability 
issues using his inflation contracting approach developed in 1995. Assuming uncertainty 
about output gap objective of the central bank, he has shown that the fundamental trade-off 
between accountability and stabilization depends on the degree of transparency, defined as the 
ability to monitor the central bank’s performance. Eijffinger and Tesfaselassie (2005) look at 
transparency about disclosure of forecasts of future shocks as well as output gap objective of 
the central bank in a three period New-Keynesian model. Their main result is that advance 
disclosure of forecasts of future shocks does not improve welfare and in some cases is not 
desirable.    3
Nevertheless, as any model, New-Keynesian models rest on a set of assumptions that 
may or may not be good approximations of true economies. Without the possibility to have 
a complete description of reality, a policymaker is likely to prefer basing policy on 
principles that are valid also if the assumptions on which the model is founded differ from 
reality. In other words, policy prescriptions should be robust to reasonable deviations from 
the benchmark model. The literature on monetary policy robustness has been developed into 
two directions
1. The first one leads to what has been called robustly optimal instrument rules 
(Svensson and Woodford, 2004; Giannoni and Woodford, 2003a, 2003b). As these instrument 
rules do not depend on the specification of the generating processes of exogenous 
disturbances in the model, they are, therefore, robust to misspecification in these processes. 
The second one, initiated by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2004), corresponds to robust control 
approach to the decision problem of agents who face model uncertainty. In the sense of 
Hansen and Sargent, robust monetary policies are designed to perform well in worst-case 
scenarios. These policies arise as the equilibrium in a game between the monetary authorities 
and an evil agent who chooses model misspecification to make the authorities look as bad as 
possible. While these two approaches to robust policies appear quite distinct, Walsh (2004) 
has demonstrated that both approaches lead to exactly the same implicit instrument rule for 
the policy maker in a standard, forward-looking, new Keynesian model of optimal monetary 
policy.  
The role of model robustness has been neglected until now in the literature on 
transparency. Consider that the central bank knows exactly the model structure of the 
economy doesn’t allow us to study some important strategic interactions between the central 
bank and private agents. In particular, policy makers may use strategically information they 
                                                           
1 Another current of research studies about the robustness of a monetary policy rule across different kinds of 
models (backward-looking, Lucas-type transmission mechanism and forward-looking models). See for example 
McCallum (1999).   4
dispose in order to gain benefits in terms of output stabilization. At the other hand, the 
robustness approaches assume that private agents know exactly the preference parameters and 
the preferences for robustness of the central bank while the latter does not know exactly the 
true model structure of the economy. This asymmetry is difficult to justify if the central bank 
has incentive to not communicate its preferences as well as the degree of model robustness.  
In this paper, we make the connection between the literature on transparency and that on 
robust control of monetary policy by assuming that the central bank doesn’t know exactly the 
true model structure of the economy and is not totally transparent about its model robustness 
preferences. In a similar framework to that used by Walsh (2003), we examine the 
interactions between transparency and robustness and their implication for accountability.  
In the section 2, we present the basic model. In the section 3, we solve the model to obtain 
the optimal penalty under perfect transparency about the preference for robustness. The 
effects of opacity about the central bank preference for robustness are discussed in section 4. 
We conclude in section 5.  
 
2.  The model 
 
Our description of economic environment follows the standard New-Keynesian model 
based on optimizing private sector behavior and nominal rigidities that has been used 
extensively in the recent literature on monetary policy (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999). 
Instead of formulating monetary policy explicitly in terms of control over the nominal interest 
rate, we simplify by treating the output gap, i.e. output relative to the flexible-price 
equilibrium level, as the instrument of monetary policy. It is assumed that the central bank 
faces model misspecification and its preference for robustness is not perfectly observable 
by the government and the public.      5
 
2.1 The economy 
The economy is characterized by an expectations augmented, forward-looking Phillips curve: 
t t t t t e x + δ + π Ε β = π +1 , with  1 0 < β < ,  0 > δ ,     (1) 
where  t π  is the inflation rate,  1 + π Ε t t  the private sector's expectation of future inflation,  t x 
the output gap,  t e  an inflation or cost shock, and β the discount rate. The parameter δ  is the 
output gap elasticity of inflation and captures the effects of the gap on real marginal costs and 
marginal cost on inflation. The cost shock  t e  is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. 
While the central bank sees the forward-looking Phillips curve described by equation (1) 
as the most likely specification, it realizes that the true Phillips curve may deviate from the 
benchmark, although it is unable to specify a probability distribution for deviations. To model 
such misspecification, we introduce in equation (1) a second type of disturbance, denoted by 
t h.  In the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2004), the disturbance is controlled by a fictitious 
“evil agent” representing the policymaker’s worst fears concerning specification errors. Thus, 
the forward-looking Phillips curve with misspecification is given by 
t t t t t t h e x + + δ + π Ε β = π +1 .                       (2) 
 
2.2 Policy objectives with preference for robustness 
In order to study the question of delegation, we distinguish as Walsh (2003) between the 
objective functions of the principal, referred to as the government (or the public), and the 
agent, the central bank. The role of the government will be to design the targeting regime 
under which the central bank conducts policy. The central bank is delegated to attain the 
target defined by the government. The failure of the central bank to achieve the target is 
associated with penalty.   6
The expected social loss function is assumed to take the standard form as following: 
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where  λ  is the relative weight placed on the output objective. Social loss depends on 
variability of the output gap as well as inflation variability.  
In the Walsh’s model, the central bank is subject to political pressures for economic 
expansions, captured by allowing for random fluctuations in the central bank’s output target. 
In the present approach, by eliminating this source of uncertainty about central bank 
preferences and the relating inflationary bias, we focus on the implications of a new kind of 
uncertainty concerning the central bank preference for robustness of monetary policy. 
Consequently, monetary policy is implemented under discretion by a central bank that has the 
same output target than the government. 
The central bank is also charged with an inflation targeting objective, defined by the 
target and the weight placed on achieving it. As the overly ambitious output target common in 
the Barro-Gordon framework is absent here, discretionary policy implemented to minimize 
(3) would not lead to an average inflation bias.  
To design the robust monetary policy, the central bank takes into account a certain 
degree of model misspecification by minimizing its objective function in the worst 
possible model within a given set of plausible models. Monetary policy is implemented to 
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t h x E L θ π π τ π λ β ,      (4) 
where  T
t π  is the period t inflation target, and  τ the weight that the central bank places on 
achieving its inflation target or deviation penalty. θ  denotes the preference for robustness 
which is known only to the central bank, but neither to the government and the private sector.   7
When taking their decision, the government and the private sector can make guesses about the 
value of  t θ  and believe that  t θ  has an average value θ  and a variance 
2
θ σ . We assume that 
t θ is independent of the cost shock  t e  so that the covariance  ) , cov( t t e θ  is zero. 
As it is common in the robust control literature (Hansen and Sargent, 2004), we 
assume that the central bank allocates a budget  2 χ   to the evil agent who creates 










t h E χ ρ .              ( 5 )  
Since parameters τ and  T
t π characterize alternative inflation targeting regimes, thus we can 
ignore irrelevant constants and terms independent of the central bank’s actions. The single 
period loss function of the central bank’s can be rewritten as  
] 2 ) )( 1 ( [
2






CB h x E θ π π π π τ λ − + − + + .       (6) 
The loss function (6) can be interpreted as in Walsh (2003) except for two elements. Firstly, 
there is absence of the random disturbance associated with output target. Secondly, the last 
term in (6) is specific to the robust control techniques adopted by the central bank. The 
penalty weight τ in the second term of (6) plays the role of Rogoff’s weight conservatism as 
if the central bank weights more heavily on inflation objective. To insure the consistence of 
the loss function, we assume that  
0 ) 1 ( > +τ ,          ( 7 )  
i.e. the deviation from inflation target constitutes always a loss.  
 
3.  Optimal Walsh’s contract under robust control with perfect transparency 
   8
We consider that the central bank acts in a discretionary manner when making its policy 
choices. The government sets up a targeting regime in fixing inflation target and the penalty 
associated with its realization. Under that regime, the central bank implements the time-
consistent discretionary monetary policy which is robust to model misspecification. 
As there is no average inflation bias in the present model, the inflation target is assumed 
to be zero ( 0 = πT
t ). The central bank’s problem is to solve under the economic constraint 
with model misspecification (equation (2)) the following program: 











h x E L
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θ π τ λ − + + = .           (8) 
The only state variable in this model is the exogenous cost shock  t e . We assume it is 
serially uncorrelated, the central bank treats expectations of future inflation as given 
(0 1 = π Ε + t t ) in setting  t x  and  t h . The first-order conditions for the central bank’s decision 
problem are: 








,        (9) 
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θ τ δ τ .      (10) 
The second-order condition for the maximization program of evil agent is derived from (10) 
as follows: 
0 )] 1 [( 0 2
2








.          ( 1 1 )  
The condition (11) yields 
  τ θ + >1 .                               (11’) 
Equations (2), (9) and (10) can be solved jointly for the equilibrium output gap and inflation 
rate under discretion with a non-state contingent target of zero inflation. It yields   9
t t e
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
θλ
π
+ − + +
= ,                     (12) 
t t e x
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
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2 τ λ δ τ λ θ
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− = ,                          (13)   
t t e h
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= .                             (14)  
where the expression  0 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [
2 > + − + + τ λ δ τ λ θ  according to condition (11’). So the 
current inflation and the model misspecification react positively to the inflationary shock, 
while the output negatively. When  ∞ → θ , the central bank is certain about its economic 
model. In this case, the solution becomes:  
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0 = t h .          (14’) 
The central bank is a risk aversion agent who wants to avoid particularly bad outcomes, and 
therefore needs policy to be robust against specification errors that could have particularly 
severe consequences. Unambiguously, the preference for robustness will affect the outcomes 
of macroeconomic variables. 
The equilibrium solution of inflation  t π , output  t x  and misspecification errors  t h  react 
to the stochastic and unverifiable realization of  t e . The accountability of the central bank 
modifies the effects of  t e  shocks on these variables as follows: 
0
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2 < −θδ λ ,      (15) 
0














,                        (16)     10
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The effect of  t e  on inflation is decreasing in τ  if the parameter representing preference 
for robustness, θ , is larger enough to ensure that  0
2 < −θδ λ . The effects of  t e  on output and 
model specification errors are decreasing and increasing respectively in τ .  The amplitude of 
these effects depends also on θ  as shown in (15)-(17). That can be shown by the following 
derivatives:  
0
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.                      (20)  
The effect of  t e  on inflation is decreasing in θ . This means that if the central bank has a 
lower preference for robustness (higher θ ), it is less aggressive in response to inflationary 
shocks
2. The effects of  t e on output and model specification errors are increasing and 
decreasing respectively in θ . 
The government, when deciding the optimal targeting weight (penalty), faces the trade-off 
between the need for accountability and the need for stabilization in taking account of the fact 
the central bank uses the robust control approach in implementing the targeting regime. 
The optimal target weight is obtained by minimizing (3) with respect to τ in taking 
account of the solution of  t π  and  t x  in equations (12)-(13). The first order condition for the 
optimal τ leads to 
                                                           
2 See also Leitemo, Kai & Ulf Söderström (2007).   11
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Manipulating (21) and using equations (12), (13), (22) and (23), the first-order condition 
becomes 
0
} ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ {
) ( ) (
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τ .                                                (25) 
The optimal solution of penalty implies that, the condition (7), i.e.  0 1 > +τ , is equivalent to 
the condition  0
2 < −θδ λ  which is used to obtain the result reported in (15). In the case where  
∞ → θ , i.e. absence of robust control, we have




.  It follows from (25) that 







. These results can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
                                                           
3 Following Walsh (2003), we can introduce in the loss function of the central bank, a parameter  t u , i.e. the 
mean zero period t realization of the net pressures for economic expansion. The realization of  t u is known by 
the central bank, although it is assumed to be unverifiable private information. Therefore, the optimal penalty 
will be  ) /( ] ) 2 [(
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
e u e u σ θδ σ λδ λσ σ θδ λδ λθδ τ + − + − =  with  0 / > ∂ ∂ θ τ  and  0 /
2 > ∂ ∂ u σ τ . The result is 
reduced to that of Walsh if  ∞ → θ  (i.e., in the absence of model misspecifications): 
2 2 2 / ) ( lim e u σ σ δ λ τ
θ
+ =
∞ → .   12
Proposition 1. When monetary policy is perfectly transparent concerning the preference for 
robustness  ( 0
2 = θ σ ), the optimal target weight τ  is negative and decreasing in terms of 
preference for robustness.  
 
We remark that in the absence of transparency issue ( 0
2 = θ σ ) and robust control (i.e. 




. Departing from this 
situation, when the central bank practices the robustness control (θ  decreases), the inflation 
rate increases and this implies higher social loss that the government seeks to minimise. In the 
classical Walsh’s contract, this will incite the government to increase the penalty (τ ) in order 
to diminish the inflationary pressures resulted from an inflationary bias. In our framework, the 
central bank has not this kind of inflationary bias as its certain output target is the same as the 
potential output. Once we assume model uncertainty, an increase in the penalty will not 
necessarily attain the same goal, since it has a double effect on inflation rate. Higher penalty 
incites the central bank to reduce inflation rate (direct effect) in favor of increased model 
misspecifications leading to higher inflation (indirect effect). Furthermore, a higher 
preference for robustness control has also a positive effect on model misspecifications leading 
to higher inflation. In our analysis, the negative direct effect of a higher penalty on inflation is 
dominated by its second indirect effect and the effect of higher preference for robust control 
on model misspecifications. Consequently, the government will counterbalance the 
inflationary effect of higher preference for robustness (lower θ ) by decreasing the penalty.  
 
4.  The effect of opacity about the robustness preference of the central bank 
   13
The results summarized in Proposition 1 are obtained under the assumption that the 
information about the preferences for robustness of the central bank is transmitted to the 
government and the private agents. In the following, we relax this assumption in admitting 
that this information is private to the monetary policymaker. That leads us to investigate 
whether the lack of transparency about the preferences for robustness (θ ) can be used 
strategically by the central bank in order to avoid penalties inflicted by the government in the 
case of deviation from the targeting regime. 
Substituting the solution of  t π  and  t x in equations (12) and (13) into expected social loss 
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The application of second-order Taylor approximation to the expected social loss function 
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Proposition 2. Starting from the initial equilibrium characterized by perfect transparency 
( 0
2 = θ σ ), an increase in the opacity about the preferences for robustness in monetary 
policymaking will incite the government to decrease the optimal target weight (i.e. 
0 /
2 < θ σ τ d d ) if the average preference for robustness is sufficiently low, i.e. 
} / , / 1 { max
2 2 δ λ δ θ > .    14
 
Proof : See Appendix.  
 
Low average preference for robustness (higher values of θ ) implies a decrease in 
inflation rate. In the case of perfect transparency, this leads to a higher penalty or smaller 
reward (see Proposition 1). The opacity of the central bank concerning its preferences for 
robustness introduces uncertainty for the government and increases the social loss. The 
optimal solution for the government is to reduce the penalty in order to counterbalance the 
negative effect of opacity on social welfare. In the contrary, if the central bank has weak anti-
inflation credentials in its robust control policy (lower values of θ , i.e. 
2 2 / 1 / δ θ δ λ < < ), 
low degree of transparency about its preference could eventually incite the government to 
increase the penalty or to decrease award.  
The effects of opacity about the model robustness on the macroeconomic performance 
can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Starting from the initial equilibrium characterized by perfect transparency 
( 0
2 = θ σ ), an increase in the opacity about the preferences for robustness in monetary 
policymaking will increase output and inflation variability if the average preference for 
robustness is sufficiently low, i.e.  } / , / 1 { max
2 2 δ λ δ θ > .  
 
Proof : Deriving equations (12)-(13) relative to 
2
θ σ  leads to 
0























,  since  0
2 < −θδ λ ,      (28) 
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.                      (29)     15
 
The effects of opacity about robustness on macroeconomic performance depend on the 
sign of its impacts on the penalty as summarized in Proposition 2. Under the condition, i.e. 
{ }
2 2 / , / 1 max δ λ δ θ > , guaranteeing  0 /
2 < θ σ τ d d , the effect of opacity on output and inflation 
variability is positive. As we have discussed before, under the optimal solution of τ  (25), the 
condition (7), i.e.  0 1 > +τ , is equivalent to assume that  0
2 < −θδ λ  or 
2 /δ λ θ > . The results 
summarized in the above proposition are closely linked to the negative effect of opacity on 
the penalty assigned by the government. Given the average preference for robust control, a 
decreased penalty leads to an amplified reaction of inflation rate to inflationary shocks as its 
direct effect on inflation rate dominates its indirect effect on inflation rate via model 
misspecifications. However, if the central bank has weak anti-inflation credentials in its 
robust control policy (lower values of θ , i.e. 
2 2 / 1 / δ θ δ λ < < ), 
2 / θ σ τ d d  could eventually 
be positive for some values of model parameters (see Appendix) as we have mentioned 
above. Then the effect of opacity on output and inflation variability could eventually be 
negative. The opacity of the central bank concerning its preferences for robustness, 
introducing uncertainty for the government, permits to reduce this penalty.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, using a New-Keynesian framework, we examine the interaction between 
monetary policy uncertainty (lack of transparency) and model uncertainty (robust control). In 
particular, we link them by assuming that the central bank doesn’t know exactly the true 
model structure of the economy and is not totally transparent about its preferences for model   16
robustness. We have found several implications of these two kinds of uncertainty for the 
accountability of the central bank vis-à-vis the government.  
Firstly, in the absence of transparency issue and robust control, it is not necessary to 
impose any penalty since we do not introduce inflationary bias in the loss function of the 
central bank. If the central bank introduces robustness policy with total transparency, any 
increase in the preferences for robustness leads to a lower penalty or higher award.  
Secondly, given high average preference for robustness, low degree of transparency of the 
central bank about its preferences for robustness reduces the penalty relative to the deviation 
of inflation rate from its target. In the contrary, if the government considers that the central 
bank has weak anti-inflation credentials in its robust control policy, low degree of 
transparency about its preference could eventually incite the government to increase the 
penalty.  
Finally, the effect of monetary policy opacity on inflation and output variability is positive 
if penalty decreases with the degree of opacity. In the contrary, if the central bank has average 
low preference for robustness, low degree of transparency about its preference could 
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Appendix:  Demonstration of Proposition 2 
 
The expected social loss function (26) can be linearized using second-order Taylor 
development as:   
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The first-order condition of government minimization problem is:  
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According to equation (11’), we have  T = + > τ θ 1 . That implies  0 ) (
2 > + + − δ λ θ λ T T . 
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condition (A.2) as: 
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) (
) ( ) ( 2
) (
] ) ( [
) ( 2





2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
3 2 2
3 3 2
2 δ θ λ
λ δ λ θ λ δ
λ λ δ
λ δ λ θ
δ λ θ λ δ
λ δ λ θ λ δ


























































































































         













































































T T T T T
            ( A . 6 )  
The condition (A.4) and equations (A.5) and (A.6) allow us to find the relationship 
between penalty parameter (τ ) and degree of opacity (
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            ( A . 7 )  
The following solution is obtained at the equilibrium where  0
2 = θ σ . Since the optimal 
solution for the penalty is  2 δ θ
λ
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and consequently  T
2 2) ( δ θ δ θ λ = + − .  Using the condition  0
2 = θ σ , (A.7) can be simplified 
to  
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Substituting  ) (
2 δ θ λ + −  by  T
2 δ θ  into the denominator of (A.8) leads to,  
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 will be the opposite sign of the numerator. 
Using  T
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1
δ
θ > .      (A.10) 
The term  ) (
2 2 T − θ  is always positive since  T = + > ) 1 ( τ θ  according to condition (11’).  
The condition  2
1
δ
θ >  is a sufficient condition to ensure that the numerator is positive. Since 
the condition  0 ) 1 ( > = + T τ  implies  0
2 < −θδ λ  in the case of transparency. So, beginning 
form an equilibrium without opacity, we have in average  0
2 < − δ θ λ  or equivalently 
2 δ
λ
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 Consequently, under the condition (A.11): 
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θ λ  could be 
negative for small values of δ  and λ . Notably, when  0   and    0 → → λ δ , the above 
expression is reduced to () 0 2
2 < + − T T θ   since  . T > θ  In this case, we will have 
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